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Abstract
The current study aimed to capture empathy processing in an interpersonal context. Mother–adolescent dyads (N¼22)
each completed an empathy task during fMRI, in which they imagined the target person in distressing scenes as either
themselves or their family (i.e. child for the mother, mother for the child). Using multi-voxel pattern approach, we com-
pared neural pattern similarity for the self and family conditions and found that mothers showed greater perceptual simi-
larity between self and child in the fusiform face area (FFA), representing high self–child overlap, whereas adolescents
showed significantly less self–mother overlap. Adolescents’ pattern similarity was dependent upon family relationship
quality, such that they showed greater self–mother overlap with higher relationship quality, whereas mothers’ pattern sim-
ilarity was independent of relationship quality. Furthermore, adolescents’ perceptual similarity in the FFA was associated
with increased social brain activation (e.g. temporal parietal junction). Mediation analyses indicated that high relationship
quality was associated with greater social brain activation, which was mediated by greater self–mother overlap in the FFA.
Our findings suggest that adolescents show more distinct neural patterns in perceiving their own vs their mother’s distress,
and such distinction is sensitive to mother–child relationship quality. In contrast, mothers’ perception for their own and
child’s distress is highly similar and unconditional.
Key words: representational similarity analysis (RSA); mother–child dyads; empathy; maternal empathy; adolescent;
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Introduction
Emotional experiences often occur in an interpersonal context.
For example, parents may experience more negative feelings
themselves when their child is upset. Experiencing empathy
with regard to others’ pain or distress is found across species
including rodents, non-human primates and humans, in
infants as young as a few months of age, as well as across many
forms of social relationships (e.g. for strangers, loved ones, etc.;
Preston and De Waal, 2002; Decety, 2011 b; Batson, 2009). At its
most basic core, empathy facilitates parental care of their off-
spring and paves the way for successful social and emotional
development in youth (Mikulincer et al., 2001; De Waal, 2008;
Decety, 2011 b). A parents’ ability to perceive and respond to
emotional cues of their offspring, such as hunger, pain or dis-
tress, is essential for survival and has been hardwired at the
neural level to promote parental care in mammalian species as
an innate protective system for their offspring (Decety, 2011 b).
Indeed, studies have shown that parental empathic experiences
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and neural engagement of the empathy network are more
intensified when parents see their own child’s pain compared
with an unknown child’s pain (Leibenluft et al., 2004; Goubert
et al., 2008). Similarly, when mothers make caregiving decisions
for their child, neural activation in the empathy network,
including the prefrontal cortex (PFC), limbic and sensory
regions, increases to meet the needs of their child (Ho et al.,
2014). Although emerging evidence supports maternal empathy
for their own child’s emotions, it is unclear whether children’s
empathy is equivalent to their parents’ emotional perception of
their offspring. Thus, the current study aimed to capture empa-
thy processes in an interpersonal context within parent–child
dyads.
One important aspect of empathy is the phenomenon by
which one blurs the line between self and other (Davis et al.,
1996; Hodges and Klein, 2001; Decety and Sommerville, 2003;
Galinsky et al., 2005; Decety and Lamm, 2006; Batson, 2009).
Theories suggest that understanding others’ emotions and
actions begin by perceptually representing or mirroring others’
feelings and actions onto one’s own states (Rizzolatti et al., 2001;
Preston and De Waal, 2002; Gallese, 2007; Keysers and Gazzola,
2009). According to Preston and de Waal’s (2002) perception–
action model, the initial perception of others’ states can lead
perceivers to have high self–other mental representation in feel-
ings and actions, thereby eliciting emotional contagion and
empathic responses as behavioral outcomes. Perceiving others’
emotion (i.e. perceptual encoding) enables individuals to simu-
late others’ states as one’s own states, and thereby forms self–
other overlap (Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Gallese, 2007; Keysers and
Gazzola, 2009). That is, how we perceive others’ emotions could
be an important gateway to how we share mental representa-
tions with others for empathic actions. An important considera-
tion for the emergence of empathy is thus whether individuals
show a similar representation of the self and other during per-
ceptual encoding and whether such perceptual similarity facili-
tates further empathic responding.
Perceptual representation for self–other overlap can be char-
acterized as a bottom-up process because it requires one to
detect and encode others’ states first (Singer, 2006; Decety,
2011a). Indeed, studies have shown that empathic responses
during the observation of others’ pain are associated with
increased activation in early perception-sensory regions such
as extrastriate body area, fusiform gyrus and sensory-motor
area (e.g. Jackson et al., 2005; Lamm et al., 2007; Lamm and
Decety, 2008). This bottom-up process may influence social cog-
nitive top-down modulation, in which the perceptual represen-
tation for others is evaluated to make subsequent inferences for
others’ situation (Decety and Sommerville, 2003; Jackson and
Decety, 2004; Singer, 2006; Decety, 2011a). For example, social
cognitive regions, such as the temporal parietal junction (TPJ),
medial PFC (MPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), show
increased activity for in-group member’s pain (Amodio and
Frith, 2006; Adams et al., 2010; Cheon et al., 2010; Mathur et al.,
2010; Morrison et al., 2012), along with increased neural activa-
tion of sensory-perception regions (Azevedo et al., 2013; Zuo and
Han, 2013). In this vein, researchers highlight the importance of
both affective and cognitive components of empathy that influ-
ence the extent of empathic concern and potential prosocial
behavior (Decety, 2005; Eisenberg and Eggum, 2009; Goubert
et al., 2009). In this model, the bottom-up affective component
helps perceivers to increase personal distress and attention for
understanding other’s affective states, and the top-down cogni-
tive component regulates perceiver’s emotional arousal and
leads to prosocial behavior by recruiting cognitive control
resources. However, too much personal distress, induced by
emotional arousal and contagion, can impede the perceiver’s
empathic behaviors as it depletes cognitive resources to regu-
late their own affective arousal, thereby failing to attend to
others’ needs (Eisenberg and Eggum, 2009).
Previous work has focused on the neural involvement of
either early sensory-perception processes (e.g. Singer et al.,
2004; Jackson et al., 2005) or higher-order social cognitive proc-
esses (e.g. Saxe et al., 2004) independently, instead of conceptu-
alizing empathy as a continuum from the initial representation
at the perception level to later social cognitive processes. Thus,
empirical research which integrates how the self and others are
represented during the initial perception and how this percep-
tual representation is associated with mentalizing processes
will shed light on our understanding of how empathy arises in
the brain. In the current study, we scanned both mothers and
their adolescent child as they engaged in a task that measures
empathic responses when perceiving their own and each
other’s distress. We sought to examine how empathic experien-
ces are modulated by perceptual representation based on the
perception-action perspective (Preston and De Waal, 2002;
Preston, 2007). In particular, we examined perceptual encoding
of self–other overlap in the fusiform face area (FFA), and
whether higher perceptual similarity is associated with
empathic responses in social–cognitive brain regions. Our per-
ceptual similarity analysis of self–other overlap focused on neu-
ral patterns in the FFA because evidence indicates that the FFA
is involved in the initial encoding of faces as an early visual per-
ception process (Ghuman et al., 2014). Importantly, the mental
imagination of faces and encoding emotionality and social
information from faces significantly increases neural activation
in the FFA (O’Craven and Kanwisher, 2000; Adolphs, 2009;
Sabatinelli et al., 2011). To quantify the representation similar-
ity, we adopted the representational similarity analysis (RSA;
Kriegeskorte et al., 2008) as a form of multi-voxel pattern
approach. This pattern-focused approach allows us to test how
neural representations when perceiving self and other are simi-
lar by focusing on signal variations of neural response across
voxels (i.e. multi-voxel pattern), rather than simply changes in
the overall fMRI magnitude between parent and adolescent
groups (i.e. univariate neural activation).
We tested three key hypotheses. First, mothers’ perceptual
representation of distress for self and child would be highly
similar, as evidenced by greater neural pattern similarity in the
FFA regardless of the quality of their relationship. In contrast,
adolescents would show less similar perceptual representation
of distress for self and mother, and such representational simi-
larity would depend upon their relationship quality. Previous
studies have indicated that parental concerns for their offspring
are stable and unconditional regardless of social environmental
factors (Acock and Bengtson, 1980; Leibenluft et al., 2004;
Goubert et al., 2008; Proulx and Helms, 2008; Driscoll and Pianta,
2011). For instance, parents’ perception of closeness to their
child is stable as parents focus on deemphasizing conflicts and
increasing support in their roles as parents for their child’s
well-being (Acock and Bengtson, 1980; Proulx and Helms, 2008;
Driscoll and Pianta, 2011). Indeed, following pregnancy, moth-
ers’ socioemotional neural system shifts to support empathy
and care of their child (Hoekzema et al., 2016). In contrast, the
adolescent period is marked by a social reorientation away from
parents and towards peers (Nelson et al., 2005). Adolescents
report decreased closeness in parent–child relationship quality
(Tsai et al., 2013), combined with exaggeration of conflicts to
diminish closeness with parents as a means of establishing
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autonomy (Fuligni and Eccles, 1993; Larson et al., 1996; Collins
and Steinberg, 2006). Thus, adolescents’ perceptual representa-
tion of distress for self and mother would be more conditional,
such that adolescents will only show high neural pattern simi-
larity in the FFA when they report stronger relationship quality.
Second, we tested whether perceptual encoding (i.e. repre-
sentational pattern similarity in the FFA) is associated with
higher social cognitive processing. Perceptual representation
similarity in the FFA, an index of self–family overlap, was used
as a regressor in a univariate general linear model (GLM) analy-
sis to link initial perception to subsequent empathic processes
in social brain regions, which include the TPJ, MPFC and PCC
(Saxe et al., 2004). In other words, the level of neural engagement
in the social brain when processing family and self will depend
on the perceptual similarity in the FFA. As suggested by theories
of empathy (e.g. Preston and de Waal’s, 2002), the initial percep-
tual representation process for others’ states subsequently elic-
its emotional contagion and empathic response. Although the
sluggish nature of the fMRI signal does not allow us to test
direct temporal influences between processes, we hypothesized
that higher perceptual similarity in the FFA, a neural index of
self–family perceptual overlap, would be associated with greater
neural recruitment of mentalizing processes in social brain
regions.
Finally, we performed mediation analyses to test an inte-
grated model linking mother–child relationship quality, the per-
ceptual similarity in self––family overlap and neural
engagement of social brain regions. We hypothesized that
greater relationship quality in adolescents would be associated
with the recruitment of social brain regions during empathic
responses, and this path would be mediated by greater encod-
ing of perceptual similarity in the FFA. Whereas relationship
quality would be a key predictor of perceptional similarity and
social brain responding in adolescents, we predicted that rela-
tionship quality would not influence empathic responses in
mothers because mothers’ socioemotional system is more sta-
ble and invariable for their offspring (Acock and Bengtson, 1980;
Proulx and Helms, 2008; Driscoll and Pianta, 2011; Hoekzema
et al., 2016).
Materials and methods
Participants
Twenty-two healthy mother–adolescent dyads were recruited
to participate in this study (adolescents: Mage¼ 13.90 years,
s.d.¼ 0.11, 21% female; mothers: Mage¼ 44.26 years, s.d.¼ 1.57,
100% female). Mothers and their adolescent child each under-
went an fMRI scan on the same day. Participants were compen-
sated $50 each for their participation. All participants provided
written informed consent and assent approved by the
Institutional Review Board.
Task design and procedure
The task was modified from prior work on neural processing of
empathy, a task which has reliably recruited neural regions
involved in mentalizing (Rameson et al., 2012; Morelli et al.,
2014). During the task, adolescents and mothers each saw indi-
viduals expressing emotional distress in negative contexts (e.g.
at a funeral or being bullied), with instructions to perceive the
target face as either their family member (family-condition;
mother for the child’s scan or child for the mother’s scan) or
themselves (self-condition). Participants were instructed to
imagine the person in the picture as themselves and to take the
perspective of the person in the picture during the self-
condition. For the family-condition, participants were
instructed to imagine the person in the picture as their parent/
child, and to take the perspective of the person in the picture as
if it were their family member. When the target individuals
appeared in the social scenes with many other people, a white
arrow was inserted to guide participants to the target face (see
Figure 1A). The stimulus conditions were balanced by gender of
target face. The gender of faces was not matched to the subject,
and participants were instructed to imagine the person in each
image as themselves (self-condition) or their family member
(family-condition) regardless of the gender of the person. The
age of the target face for each group (e.g. family and self) was
matched. Each trial lasted between 8 and 9.2 s and was followed
by 2 s rating phase consisting of a 10-point Likert scale to indi-
cate how they felt from 5 (very negative) to 5 (very positive).1
Two independent blocks for self- and family conditions con-
sisted of 12 event-related trials each (i.e. mixed-design). Each
block was separated by a 5-s blank screen, and inter-trial inter-
vals were inserted between trials to separate the BOLD signal
jittered between 2.0 and 3.2 s (mean¼ 2.4 s).
fMRI data acquisition and analysis
Image acquisition, preprocessing and registration. Imaging data
were collected using a 3T-Siemens Trio MRI scanner with a 32-
channel matrix coil. High-resolution structural images (T1-
MPRAGE) were acquired first (repetition time or TR¼ 1.9 s; echo
time or TE¼ 2.3 ms; matrix size¼ 256 256; field of view or
FOV¼ 230 mm; flip angle or FA¼ 90; 1 mm isotropic voxel). T2*-
weighted echoplanar images were acquired during the emotion
perception task (38 slices with 0.3 mm inter-slice gap; TR¼ 2 s;
TE¼ 25 ms; matrix¼ 92 92; FOV¼ 230 mm; FA¼ 90; voxel size
2.5 2.5 mm; slice thickness¼ 3 mm).
Preprocessing was carried out using FEAT (FMRI Expert
Analysis Tool) Version 6.00, part of FSL (FMRIB’s Software
Library; Smith et al., 2004). The following pre-statistics process-
ing was applied: motion correction using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson
et al., 2002); non-brain removal using BET (Smith, 2002); grand-
mean intensity normalization of the entire 4D data set by a sin-
gle multiplicative factor; spatial smoothing applied only for uni-
variate whole-brain analysis with Gaussian kernel of full width
at half maximum 6 mm. For univariate analysis, registration
matrix was estimated additionally between functional images,
high-resolution structural images and standard Montreal
Neurological Institute (MNI) 2-mm brain using FLIRT (Jenkinson
and Smith, 2001; Jenkinson et al., 2002).
RSA (multi-voxel pattern analysis). For the RSA, we first estimated
single-trial activation patterns for each trial using least squares
single methods (Mumford et al., 2012) where each single-level
GLM included regressors for a current trial and all other remain-
ing trials with temporal derivate regressor. We included the
1 A repeated measure of ANOVA (condition: self and family X group:
mother and adolescent) found that there was no main effect of condi-
tion or interaction (all ps > 0.29), but a significant main effect of group
(p ¼ 0.001), indicating mothers rated painful scenes as more negative
than adolescents regardless of stimulus types (children: -0.84 vs. moth-
ers: -2.19). Subsequent t-tests indicated that all ratings for both self
and family conditions of mothers and adolescents were significantly
different from 0 (0 ¼ rating as non-arousing, all ps < 0.001), indicating
that both mothers and children perceived painful scenes as negative
across all stimulus types.
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rating phase in the model as a regressor of non-interest (i.e. nui-
sance regressor) as well as motion regressors (six motion
parameters and motion-outlier points). For each participant,
the standardized voxel-wise pattern activity (i.e. z-transformed
parameter estimates) was extracted and vectorized within the
FFA region of interest (ROI) (see ROI selection for more details).
The extracted patterns were then analyzed by calculating pair-
wise Pearson coefficient (i.e. similarity value) between each trial
with every possible pair of other trials (Figure 1B), and then
applied Fisher’s r-to-z transformation, producing a symmetric
24 24 similarity matrix for each dyad and the ROI (Figure 1C).
Finally, the average of self–family similarity values was used for
subsequent analyses (e.g. Visser et al., 2011).
Univariate group-level analysis with RSA as a covariate. To assess
how perceptual encoding (i.e. representational pattern similar-
ity in FFA) is associated with higher-level social cognitive proc-
essing, an additional standard two-stage mixed-effects analysis
was performed. The GLM of the BOLD signal for each perception
type (family and self) was estimated with temporal derivate
regressors at the first level using a double-gamma hemody-
namic response function. We added the rating phase in the
model as a regressor of non-interest (i.e. nuisance regressor) to
the design matrix as well as motion regressors (six motion
parameters and motion-outlier points). The individuals’ data
were then inputted into a random-effects model using cluster
detection statistics with outlier-deweighting at a threshold of
Z> 2.3 and a cluster probability of P< 0.05 (one-tailed), corrected
for whole-brain multiple comparisons using Gaussian Random
Field Theory. In particular, we entered each individual’s FFA
similarity values (demeaned for each group) as covariates in the
group-level analysis to examine how perceptual similarity in
the FFA to self and other is associated with neural encoding of
self and other in social–cognitive regions.
ROI selection. In this study, we indexed neural representation at
the encoding stage by examining neural pattern similarity
within the FFA, a key region in visual face encoding (Kanwisher
et al., 1997). We constructed the ROI mask of a priori voxels asso-
ciated with ‘FFA’, ‘emotional face’, ‘faces’ and ‘face perception’
from the reversed inference map (q< 0.1 FDR-corrected) in the
NeuroSynth database (http://www.neurosynth.org; downloaded
on 24 November 2015). The final FFA voxels were then selected
along with the ventral temporal cortex at Z¼ 3.71 (Figure 1B; a
total 321 voxels).
Family relationship quality
To capture a comprehensive measure of relationship quality
between mothers and adolescent children, three measures
were assessed from both mothers and adolescent children: fam-
ily cohesion (Family Adaptation and Cohesion Evaluation Scales
II inventory, FACE II; Olson et al., 1979), family conflict (Ruiz
et al., 1998; Telzer et al., 2014) and family identity (Tyler and
Degoey, 1995). We created a composite score of positive family
relationship quality by taking the score of family cohesion,
reverse-scored family conflict and family identity, with higher
scores indicating more positive parent–child relationships. This
composite score provides us with a comprehensive measure of
relationship quality using these three dimensions (Qu et al.,
2015). Details for each scale are as follows:
Family cohesion. Participants completed the Cohesion subscale
of the FACE II (Olson et al., 1979). They responded to 10 items
that assessed how close they feel and how much time they
spend with their mother [child] on a 5-point Likert scale from 1
(almost never) to 5 (almost always). Sample items included ‘My
mother [child] and I do things together’, ‘My mother [child] and
I are supportive of each other during difficult times’, and ‘My
mother [child] and I feel close to one another’ (internal consis-
tency a¼ 0.81 for mother; a¼ 0.88 for child). The 10 items were
averaged, and higher scores indicate greater relationship
closeness.
Family conflict. Parent–child conflict was assessed by 10 items
(Ruiz et al., 1998; Telzer et al., 2014) (e.g. ‘You and your parents
[child] had a serious argument or fight’ and ‘You and your
parents [child] yelled or raised your voices at each other’).
Participants reported how true each item was for them in the
past month on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘almost never’ to
‘almost always’ (a¼ 0.88 and 0.92 for mother and child, respec-
tively). The 10 items were averaged, such that higher scores
indicate greater conflicts with family members.
Family identity. Participants completed an eight-item scale that
assessed the extent to which their family is an important aspect
of their identity (Tyler and Degoey, 1995). Using a 5-point scale
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), participants indi-
cated how much their sense of self was internalized to their
family value (e.g. ‘I feel like a valued member of my family’ and
‘My family is important to the way I think of myself as a person’;
a¼ 0.83 and 0.87 for mother and child, respectively). The eight
items were averaged, and higher scores indicate greater inter-
nalized family values.
Fig. 1. (A) Experimental condition for mothers and adolescent children, (B) schematic procedure of computing similarity values within the region of interest between
trials and (C) example of the representational similarity matrix.
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Results
RSA: perceptual similarity for self and family
To examine how mothers and adolescent children perceive the
emotional distress of their family and self at the perceptual
level, we compared the similarity value in FFA of mothers when
perceiving their own and their child’s emotional distress and of
adolescents when perceiving their own and their mother’s emo-
tional distress. As shown in Figure 2A, mothers showed greater
neural similarity in perceptual representation in the FFA when
perceiving emotional distress in self vs child (M¼ 0.24,
s.d.¼ 0.06), whereas their adolescent children showed signifi-
cantly less neural pattern similarity between the conditions
(M¼ 0.17, s.d.¼ 0.07), paired-t(20)¼4.11, P< 0.05, 95% confi-
dence interval (CI) 50 000 bootstrap resampling¼0.09 to 0.03. That
is, mothers’ perception of their child’s emotional distress within
each dyad is more similar to their own emotional distress com-
pared with their own adolescent child’s perception of self and
mother.
As hypothesized, children’s perceptual similarity was
dependent upon their family relationship quality, such that they
showed greater perceptual similarity when they reported higher
relationship quality, r(22)¼ 0.45, P< 0.05, 95% CI 50 000 bootstrap
resampling¼ 0.09–0.72, whereas mothers’ neural pattern similarity
was high and independent of relationship quality, r(21)¼ 0.07,
P> 0.05, 95% CI 50 000 bootstrap resampling¼0.42 to 0.52 (Figure 2B).
To rule out the possibility of ceiling effects relating to the finding
that there was no association between mother’s perceptual simi-
larity and relationship quality compared to adolescents, we com-
pared the relationship quality in dyads and found no significant
difference between mother and child, paired-t(21)¼0.14,
P> 0.05, 95% CI 50 000 bootstrap resampling¼0.38 to 0.32. This result
indicates that the null finding for mothers was not due to ceiling
effects for relationship quality. In sum, mothers show high self–
child overlap in perceptual similarity in the FFA regardless of
their relationship quality with their child. In contrast, adolescent
children only showed high perceptual similarity in the FFA when
they also reported high relationship quality with their family,
suggesting that adolescent children’s self–family overlap is
dependent upon their relationship quality.
Group-level univariate analysis with FFA similarity
predicting social brain activation for self and family
To test the prediction that higher neural similarity for self and
family at the perceptual level is associated with neural process-
ing in higher-level, social–cognitive regions, we examined
which brain regions covaried with perceptual similarity in the
FFA. To this end, we used FFA similarity from the self and fam-
ily conditions and regressed this similarity value onto neural
activation when perceiving self vs family’s emotional distress
(self> family). Note that greater activation for this contrast rep-
resents greater differences in neural responses to self and fam-
ily. We found that greater perceptual similarity between self
and family in adolescents was negatively associated with neu-
ral activation in several social brain regions including bilateral
TPJ, PCC and mPFC (Figure 3A and Table 1), suggesting that
greater similarly in the FFA at the encoding stage was associ-
ated with lower differentiation of self and family in the social
brain processing for empathy.
Next, we regressed family relationship quality onto neural
activation when perceiving self vs family’s emotional distress
and found negative correlations in several social brain regions
as a function of adolescents’ family relationship quality (Figure
3B and Table 2). That is, adolescents who reported greater rela-
tionship quality showed lower differentiation of self and family
in the social brain during empathic responding. Social brain
regions of mothers were not modulated by the perceptual simi-
larity for self and child (see Table 1 for local maxima regions in
the clusters).
Mediation analysis
To integrate the results of perceptual similarity in the FFA, neu-
ral engagement in the social brain and family relationship qual-
ity, we performed a mediation analysis. We tested whether
relationship quality (i.e. independent variable) is associated
with less differentiation of self and family in social–cognitive
regions (i.e. outcome) through increased perceptual similarity in
the FFA (i.e. mediator). To this end, we extracted and averaged
activation from the social brain regions which were identified in
the analyses above, and performed mediation analyses using
the mediation toolbox in Matlab (Wager et al., 2008). As shown
Fig. 2. (A) Whisker plot for the neural pattern similarity between self and family condition calculated within FFA ROI. Black and white bar within indicate mean and
median, respectively. Red-colored dots indicate individual’s similarity point; one mother had extremely low similarity value (0.002; gray-colored square) that was far
less than 2.5 s.d. under the mean. We excluded this mother for the final analyses. (B) Scatter plots of the similarity values and relationship quality for adolescents and
mothers. Dotted lines indicate 95% CI of the regression line. Note that all statistical results remained same when the outlier mother was included; 95% CI¼0.09
to0.03 for panel A and 95% CI¼0.29 to 0.68 for panel B.
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in Figure 4, the path between family relationship quality and
perceptual similarity in the FFA for self and mother (path a;
a¼ 0.05, P< 0.05, 95% CI 50 000 bootstrap resampling¼ 0.01–0.09) and
the path between perceptual similarity and social brain regions
identified in the univariate analysis (path b; b¼2.50, P< 0.05,
95% CI 50 000 bootstrap resampling¼4.07 to 1.20) were statistically
significant. Importantly, the mediation effect was significant
(ab¼0.11, P< 0.05, 95% CI 50 000 bootstrap resampling¼0.25 to
0.01), indicating that greater perceptual similarity for self and
family explains the link between strong family relationship
quality and less differentiation in the social brain for self vs
family. Only adolescents showed this significant mediating
effect, whereas mothers did not (ab¼ 0.01, P> 0.05, 95% CI 50 000
bootstrap resampling¼0.07 to 0.09). In sum, these results suggest
that not only is the quality of the relationship important for
high perceptual similarity for both the self and their family but
also that high self–other overlap at the perceptual level explains
the link between family relationship quality and empathic
responding in higher-level social–cognitive regions.
Discussion
In this study, we examined mothers and their child’s empathic
neural representations for the self and family. Using represen-
tation similarity analysis, we found that mothers’ perceptual
similarity in the FFA for self and their child’s emotional distress
was significantly higher compared to their child’s self–mother
perceptual similarity, indicating that mothers show high self–
child overlap compared to their adolescent child. In contrast,
adolescents’ perceptual similarity was dependent upon their
relationship quality, such that they showed high self–other
overlap for their mother’s emotional distress and their own
only when they reported high relationship quality with their
family. It is worth noting that these similarity results were
based on within-family comparisons, indicating that each
mother shows higher perceptual similarity than her own child.
Moreover, this initial perceptual representation in the fusiform
in adolescents was associated with neural activation in social
brain regions required to put oneself in another’s shoes (Saxe
et al., 2006), whereas no such modulatory effects of perceptual
similarity on the social brain were found in mothers. Consistent
with previous evidence showing that parents’ perspective to
their child is more stable and robust, whereas adolescent chil-
dren begin to reduce closeness with their parents as a means of
establishing autonomy (Acock and Bengtson, 1980; Proulx and
Helms, 2008; Driscoll and Pianta, 2011), these results suggest
that mothers’ empathy to their child is more unconditional
compared to that of their adolescent child. Finally, the media-
tion model confirmed that family relationship quality is associ-
ated with adolescent’s mental representation for both the self
and their family at the perceptual (i.e. fusiform perceptual rep-
resentation similarity) and higher-level social cognitive process-
ing level.
Mothers’ attention is unconditionally directed toward their
offspring to understand, make sense of and respond to their
child’s feelings and behaviors across the lifespan. This mater-
nal empathic bias has deep evolutionary underpinnings at the
neural level to be selective and protective of her own offspring
(De Waal, 2008; Decety, 2011 b) such that mothers’ empathy
promotes positive developmental outcomes, such as mood
stability and regulated stress reactivity in developing youth
(Abraham et al., 2017). Our findings support this perspective
for maternal empathy by showing that maternal empathic
processes for their child are more robust compared to chil-
dren. In our mediation model, we found that mothers’ mental-
izing process for their child’s emotional distress was
modulated by neither the relationship quality nor the degree
of self–child overlap in the FFA. It is possible that mothers
were at ceiling with less variability in perceptual similarity in
the FFA as well as social brain activation. Importantly, a recent
neuroimaging study revealed that brain regions associated
with empathy are dramatically reconfigured after pregnancy
in a mother’s brain (Hoekzema et al., 2016), which enables
mothers to be more selective and sensitive to their own off-
spring. In other words, the neural connections in mothers’
brains become fine-tuned and strengthened to utilize neural
resources optimally for their own offspring. This neural recon-
figuration is enduring for mothers after pregnancy and into
adolescence, highlighting mothers’ strong self–child overlap.
In contrast, adolescents are establishing a sense of identity by
expanding their social network, spending more time and shar-
ing their affection with others outside of the family (Larson
et al., 1996). Unlike mothers, adolescents’ brains are more
likely to be sensitive to their social environment (Blakemore
and Mills, 2014), particularly their peers (Nelson et al., 2005).
Therefore, adolescents’ mental representations are more flexi-
ble depending on social contexts (Crone and Dahl, 2012). Thus,
this study suggests that adolescents’ empathy is more condi-
tional whereas mothers show empathy for their child that is
stable and unconditional.
The current findings elaborate upon previous theories
(Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Preston and De Waal, 2002; Gallese,
2007; Keysers and Gazzola, 2009) by showing how empathic
experiences arise based on the interaction of two different
processes, the bottom-up perceptual encoding process and the
top-down social cognition process. Theories of empathy pro-
pose that empathy to others includes various mental and
behavioral phenomena, such as shared and vicarious emo-
tional experiences associated with prosocial (helping) reac-
tions as a result of perceiving others’ emotional states
(Preston and De Waal, 2002; Singer, 2006; Preston, 2007;
Decety, 2011a). Therefore, an approach to integrate these two
Fig. 3. Negatively covaried social brain regions (circled area) with (A) the
increased family–self perceptual similarity of FFA (B) the degree of family rela-
tionship quality in family–self contrast of adolescent children. See also Table 1
and 2 for other clusters.
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empathy components (‘perception and action’ or ‘bottom-up
and top-down processing’) with a continuum perspective is
critical for understanding empathic experiences. The current
study demonstrates that perceptual representation similarity
in the fusiform, representing an initial mental representation
of self–other emotional distress, is an important gateway to
neural activation involved in higher social cognitive process-
ing. Interestingly, this two-component model was only valid
for adolescents.
In our study, the quality of perceptual representation at the
encoding level in the FFA was quantified using RSA as a form of
multi-voxel pattern approach. Employing neural pattern
approach allows us to examine neural representational patterns
in the perceptual region (i.e. FFA for facial expression) rather
than simply examining whether this region shows differential
neural activation to self vs others’ emotional distress (i.e.
univariate analysis). To our knowledge, this is the first study to
examine how perceptual representation at the encoding level is
related to the degree of empathy processing at the social–cogni-
tive level. However, it should be noted that our model implying
the temporal aspects of empathic experience from the initial
encoding to later social cognition could not be tested directly.
Although we built this model based on previous theories and
empirical evidence in empathy (Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Preston
and De Waal, 2002; Jackson et al., 2005; Singer, 2006; Gallese,
2007; Lamm et al., 2007; Lamm and Decety, 2008; Keysers and
Gazzola, 2009; Decety, 2011a), the sluggish nature of the BOLD
signal precludes our ability to test the model in a temporal man-
ner, and thus the current results cannot confirm causality
explicitly between these two distinct processes. Experimental
designs that can disentangle these two processes in a causal
manner would help us to probe the temporal influences
Table 1. Brain regions which correlated with perceptual similarity on family-self condition in adolescents
Adolescent
MNI
Self>Family H BA Z-score k x y z
Perceptual similarity: negative covariation
Temporal parietal junction (TPJ) L 39 4.21 279 34 68 44
R 39 4.17 468 42 64 48
Medial PFC (mPFC) L 11 3.64 28 4 36 12
Posterior cingulate gyrus (PCC) – – 4.12 209 2 28 28
Angular gyrus/inferior parietal lobe (IPL) R 40 3.55 63 46 52 54
Anterior cingulate gyrus (ACC) – 32 3.78 194 6 42 4
Brain stem – – 2.98 43 10 30 10
Insula L 4 4.02 186 42 8 16
L 13 3.41 85 40 8 0
R 1 2.75 28 44 18 16
Dorsal lateral PFC (DLPFC) L 46 3.17 53 40 44 6
R 9 2.86 22 42 40 34
Inferior temporal gyrus (ITG) R 37 3.59 47 56 52 16
DLPFC R 8 4.07 137 42 16 52
Auditory cortex R 41 2.93 20 62 24 12
Primary somatosensory cortex R 1 3.13 60 62 16 36
Secondary somatosensory cortex R 40 3.11 20 42 26 18
Primary motor cortex R 6 3.37 151 42 10 64
Superior parietal lobule (SPL) R 7 3.11 22 30 54 62
Superior temporal gyrus (STG) R 41 3.27 49 68 26 10
TPJ R 40 3.95 181 64 24 42
R 40 3.38 45 56 36 52
Fusiform gyrus R 37 3.65 67 40 56 16
Thalamus L 50 3.33 151 14 30 8
Perceptual similarity: positive covariation No significant activations
Mothers
Perceptual similarity: negative covariation
Auditory Cortex L 41 3.32 58 40 22 10
L 41 3.08 29 42 34 10
Insula L 6 3.35 88 52 2 2
L 13 2.9 20 42 10 0
R 6 2.74 20 54 4 8
Primary somatosensory cortex L 4 4.2 88 64 12 18
Secondary somatosensory cortex L 40 3.01 29 54 26 16
Primary motor cortex R 6 3.41 39 64 4 16
STG R 22 4.44 30 68 12 0
L 6 3.74 31 54 2 0
Perceptual similarity: positive covariation No significant activations
Notes: Reported regions and their ‘local maxima’ were at 50% probability locations on the Harvard–Oxford atlas with more than 20 voxels. H, hemisphere;
BA, Brodmann area; k, the number of voxels.
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Table 2. Brain regions which correlated with mother-child relationship quality on family-self condition in adolescents
Adolescent
MNI
Self> Family H BA Z-score k x y z
Relationship quality: negative covariation\
Medial PFC (mPFC) L 10 3.97 125 2 50 12
R 10 3.55 79 2 50 10
L 10 3.45 74 6 54 4
R 10 3.14 23 4 48 8
Posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) 31 3.22 212 4 30 46
Temporal parietal junction (TPJ) L 19 3.82 394 44 66 20
Anterior cingulate gyrus (ACC) 32 3.5 371 6 6 36
Amygdala L 34 3.95 230 26 2 20
R 49 3.52 123 26 2 10
Angular gyrus/inferior parietal lobe (IPL) L 39 3.5 21 56 54 24
R 39 2.76 48 60 50 36
Insula L 13 4.4 255 40 14 2
R 44 4.26 266 42 6 6
R 13 4.21 250 38 8 6
L 4 4.17 216 42 8 16
Orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) L 47 4.3 197 28 34 14
R 3.37 176 22 12 16
mPFC L 10 3.84 240 2 62 2
R 2.86 22 2 62 2
Auditory cortex R 41 3.85 59 46 28 12
R 41 3.37 31 44 22 12
L 41 3.14 30 40 22 10
Hippocampus L 54 3.76 219 28 16 18
R 54 3.09 121 28 32 6
Inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) L 45 3.62 29 52 16 0
L 45 3.35 54 40 22 6
R 9 2.65 20 56 28 16
Inferior temporal gyrus (ITG) L 37 3.49 108 36 38 28
R 20 3.06 24 58 30 26
Lateral occipital cortex—inferior division R 37 3.45 67 54 64 12
L 19 3.09 32 50 70 12
Lingual gyrus L 19 3.18 70 8 60 2
Middle temporal gyrus (extended to posterior superior temporal sulcus pSTS) R 21 3.98 38 62 2 18
R 37 3.63 106 60 54 10
L 39 3.24 32 56 58 6
R 21 3.06 115 66 24 20
L 21 2.99 54 56 26 8
Basal ganglia: pallidum R 51 3.65 87 22 6 2
L 3.41 34 26 16 0
Putamen R 49 3.88 258 24 8 10
L 49 3.75 273 30 14 0
Parahippocampal gyrus L 37 3.46 31 28 30 22
Primary somatosensory cortex L 1 3.72 138 56 18 30
R 40 3.69 112 66 16 20
Secondary somatosensory cortex R 40 4.59 85 58 24 18
L 40 3.24 119 48 34 20
Superior temporal gyrus (STG) R 22 3.92 27 56 2 2
R 22 3.72 58 68 14 2
L 22 3.53 23 42 16 4
R 22 3.02 26 56 2 14
Primary motor cortex R 6 4.17 101 42 10 56
Supplementary motor area R 6 2.86 21 6 4 52
Precuneous L 18 2.96 31 14 58 16
Supramarginal gyrus L 21 4.05 99 62 26 38
R 40 3.9 164 62 22 36
R 40 3.15 80 56 36 52
Fusiform gyrus R 37 4.06 66 38 32 20
(continued)
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between the bottom-up and top-down processes in empathic
experiences.
Nonetheless, some evidence highlights the importance of
early sensory-perception processing for later social–cognitive
processing. For example, emotion perception studies have dem-
onstrated that emotional information is pre-evaluated during
the early encoding in perception-sensory regions, such as
somatosensory and early visual cortex (e.g. Stolarova et al., 2005;
Greening et al., 2016;). Importantly, early sensory-perception
bottom-up processing shifts the quality of later cognitive
top-down processing, such that impairment of somatosensory
processing can impair recognition of face emotions at the later
top-down stage (Adolphs et al., 2000). Similarly, event-related
potential (ERP) research has shown that late top-down process-
ing in face emotion recognition reflected by late the cognitive
component (400–800 ms) is significantly modulated depending
on how face stimuli are encoded at the early bottom-up stage
represented at the early sensory-perception component (200–
300 ms; Lee et al., 2010). Thus, it is plausible that social brain
region changes observed in the current study are influenced by
perceptual representation at the encoding level first. Our regres-
sion model using mediation also supports this pathway, such
that perceptual similarity in the FFA significantly mediated the
association between relationship quality and social brain acti-
vation to self and family.
In the current study, we recruited mothers and adolescents
using dyadic recruitment (i.e. mothers and adolescents from
the same family), which is a strength of the sample. However,
the sample size is relatively small, precluding our ability to
examine sex differences among adolescents or between moth-
ers and fathers. Furthermore, our adolescent-only sample does
not allow us to probe why adolescents show less self–other
overlap compared to adults (i.e. mothers). For example, it is pos-
sible that there may be linear increases in self–family overlap
across development, as social cognitive abilities increase across
this age range. Thus, recruitment of pre-adolescent children
would further enable us to probe whether the effects we found
change linearly with age. Moreover, examining other targets in
the task (e.g. peers) would help us tease apart whether the
source of low self–mother overlap is due to adolescents begin-
ning to show greater self–other overlap with their peers as they
transition into adolescence (Nelson et al., 2005). Longitudinal
research and studies recruiting larger and different samples
including children, adolescents, peers and other family mem-
bers (e.g. sibling and father) will help to unpack developmental
trajectories in empathic responding for self and other.
This study shows that relationship quality may set the stage
for social–cognitive processing and may positively affect brain
development in social–cognitive regions. Such development
may have broader implications for empathy development and
adolescents’ ability to mentalize and take the perspective of
others’ emotions. Our results can inform future interventions
for increasing empathy and related prosocial behavior by eluci-
dating the role of relationship quality in promoting social–
Table 2. (continued)
Adolescent
MNI
Self> Family H BA Z-score k x y z
R 37 3.49 101 50 44 22
R 37 2.99 25 32 68 14
Temporal pole R 38 3.94 281 56 8 16
L 38 3.83 105 54 14 8
Thalamus L 50 3.24 128 10 16 4
R 3.09 71 22 24 12
Relationship quality: positive covariation No significant activations
Mothers
Relationship quality: negative covariation No significant activations
Relationship quality: positive covariation No significant activations
ACC 24 3.53 50 0 28 16
Notes: Reported regions and their ‘local maxima’ were at 50% probability locations on the Harvard–Oxford atlas with more than 20 voxels. H, hemisphere; BA,
Brodmann area; k, the number of voxels.
Fig. 4. Perceptual similarity in the FFA mediates the link between perceived family connectedness and social brain activation in adolescents. Note that asterisk indi-
cates statistical significance at P¼0.05 (95% CI) based on 50 000 bootstrapping resampling.
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cognitive processing. Thus, interventions designed to enhance
relationship quality with others may promote greater self–other
overlap, thereby enhancing empathy and prosocial relation-
ships in youth.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to directly examine
empathy processes with a continuum perspective from the ini-
tial perceptual representation to the later mentalizing stage at
the neural level by employing both multivariate (i.e. representa-
tional neural pattern analysis) and univariate approaches (i.e.
general linear model). Moreover, by scanning both mothers and
their children, we compared how adolescents’ and their moth-
ers’ empathy for their family and the self are similar. Our results
suggest that mothers have unconditional empathic responses
to their child’s emotional distress based on higher self–child
overlap in their mental representation, whereas adolescents’
empathy is more conditional. This study contributes to our
knowledge about empathy processes with the critical impor-
tance of perceptual representation in mentalizing others’ emo-
tional distress.
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